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THE CAMPAIGN OF 1862.

"Vixere fortes ante Agamemnona."

AN able article in the April number, by an author whose reputation is deservedly national, has for its subject "McClellan's Last Service to the Republic," the key-note of which is found in one of its statements, that he was "the General who saved the capital." As this article is written for the purposes and benefit of history, and as the writer is one whose name adds, and with justice adds, weight to anything he may say, history will doubtless be gratified to know that this contribution to its pages can stand examination as to its assertions of fact.

If it indeed be true that, in the campaign of 1862, McClellan was "the General who saved the capital," there are many people of ordinary intelligence who are not as yet sufficiently aware of the fact, and there is much of history upon that subject which is in a state of unparalleled confusion. In truth, such is the want of definite information in the premises, and such the contradictory state of evidence, that there have been those heard to say that, if the "Young Napoleon" left undone anything to insure what the April article terms "the defeat and disorderly retreat of Pope," it has not been hitherto revealed.

It may be that McClellan is the great warrior that admiring friends have claimed him to be. We certainly have no disposition to detract from his just fame; but, in considering whether he is really worthy of being entitled the Great Captain of the age, there are many things in his career to be taken into account.

The glory of the Peninsular campaign will doubtless continue to be entirely his own, and probably no one will dispute his title, or envy the enjoyment which its glory affords. His most vigorous efforts, during that historic period, appear to have been divided

between expressing himself most lugubriously as to the fearful proportions of the enemy in his front ; bickering with the Government as to the amount of force under his command—a problem he seems never to have understood ; and frantic appeals for reënforcements to an army whose numbers had already demonstrated his incapacity to handle one of any considerable size.

The Peninsular campaign was undertaken against Mr. Lincoln's remonstrance. In a paper dated February 3, 1862, he put a few plain questions, of a common-sense nature, that demonstrated the shallowness of the whole Peninsular idea.

He, however, gave way. He intrusted to McClellan the management of the whole business, only stipulating that sufficient force should be left to make Washington perfectly safe. A council of officers determined in what that safety should consist, and it involved a contingency of about fifty-five thousand men. McClellan went off, forgetting or slighting this little feature of the programme. The matter was referred to Adjutant-General Thomas and General E. A. Hitchcock, who reported thus : "In view of the opinion expressed by the council of the commanders of army corps of the force necessary for the defense of the capital, though not numerically stated, and of the force represented by General McClellan as left for that purpose, we are of the opinion that the requirements of the President, that the city shall be left entirely secure," not only in the opinion of the General-in-Chief, but that of the commanders of the army corps, also "have not been fully complied with."

This report was made April 2d. The day before, with that loose notion of numbers that characterized the General-in-Chief, he had reported to Adjutant-General Thomas that the forces left in front of Washington were fifty-four thousand four hundred and fifty-six men. Not a bad joke, considering the day, when on the next, April 2d, General Wadsworth, with whom these men were supposed to be left and who was charged with the defense of the city, reported that there were under his command only nineteen thousand and twenty-two, of which he says nearly all are "new and imperfectly disciplined." When, therefore, McClellan, who was charged with the defense of Washington as much as he was with the capture of Richmond, made a mistake in his calculations, he had no right to complain because the President merely carried out what he himself had already engaged to do. To that complaint the President gave the following crushing reply, April 9th : "My implicit order, that Washington should, by the judgment of all the commanders

of army corps, be left entirely secure, had been neglected. It was precisely this that drove me to detain McDowell. . . . And allow me to ask, do you really think I should permit the line from Richmond, *via* Manassas Junction, to this city, to be entirely open, except what resistance could be presented by less than twenty thousand unorganized troops? This is a question which the country will not allow me to evade."

When, therefore, it is written in the April article, "From the President down, through the various ranks of politicians by whom he was surrounded, all knew in their hearts that the only reason why McClellan had failed to reach Richmond, and been obliged to execute his flank movement to the James, was because McDowell had been arrested, by express orders from Washington, in his march to effect a junction with McClellan's right," it is submitted that the facts in the case do not shift the responsibility for that failure from the shoulders of McClellan to those of Mr. Lincoln.

On the 5th of April he sat down before Yorktown. He states, "Information which I had collected during the winter placed General Magruder's command at from fifteen to twenty thousand men." April 7th he telegraphs the Secretary of War, "It seems clear that I shall have the whole force of the enemy on my hands—probably not less than (100,000) one hundred thousand men, and probably more." Magruder, the rebel commander at Yorktown, in his official report, makes the following observations: "I was compelled to place in Gloucester Point, Yorktown, and Mulberry Island, fixed garrisons amounting to six thousand men, my whole force being eleven thousand, so that it will be seen that the balance of the line, embracing a length of thirteen miles, was defended by about five thousand men."

It was "the balance of the line" that McClellan besieged, with reference to which Magruder says: "Thus, with five thousand men, exclusive of the garrisons, we stopped and held in check over one hundred thousand of the enemy. . . . The men slept in the trenches and under arms, but, to my utter surprise, he permitted day after day to elapse without an assault."

This is the view our hero took of the five thousand rebels, and their mud fences: "I made, on the 6th and 7th, close personal reconnaissance of the right and left of the enemy's positions, which, with information acquired already, convinced me that it was best to prepare for an assault by the preliminary employment of heavy guns and some siege operations. Instant assault would have been simple folly."

And here the Great Captain remained, from the 5th of April until the 4th of May, when, as he states, "our batteries would have been ready to open on the morning of the 6th of May at latest ; but on the morning of the 4th it was discovered that the enemy had already been compelled to evacuate his position during the night."

That faction of the American people who have not habitually regarded McClellan as a demi-god have at times indecorously asserted that there never was a period in his whole military career when he was absolutely "ready" to do anything. It will, however, be seen, in the light of history, that he was ready to open his batteries on the 6th, on the enemy, they having vamosed upon the 4th.

This pause of a month in front of Yorktown was not with the entire approbation of the authorities, judging from certain expressions of President Lincoln, to this effect : "The country will not fail to note, is now noting, that the present hesitation to move upon an intrenched enemy is but the story of Manassas repeated." On the 1st of May the President telegraphs : "Your call for Parrott guns from Washington alarms me, chiefly because it argues indefinite procrastination. Is anything to be done?"

But if the knowledge he had of the enemy's forces was abundant, the amount of information he did not possess with regard to his own appears to be still more voluminous. April 7th, he telegraphed to the President that he had but eighty-five thousand men, to which the President replied : "There is a curious mystery about the number of troops now with you. When I telegraphed you on the 6th, saying you had over a hundred thousand with you, I had just obtained from the Secretary of War a statement taken, as he had said, from your own returns, making one hundred and eight thousand men then with you and *en route* to you. You now say you will have but eighty-five thousand when all *en route* to you shall have reached you. How can the discrepancy of twenty-three thousand be accounted for?"

The report of the assistant Secretary of War, John Tucker, April 5th, states that, prior to this date, there were landed at Fort Monroe one hundred and twenty-one thousand five hundred men. Why it was that the General-in-Chief never seemed to know how many men he had under him does not appear. Perhaps he was appalled at the task of attempting to count them.

If, with an army of one hundred thousand men, to be held at bay for a month by five thousand ; to be compelled to dig trenches,

throw up works, mount siege-guns, and make regular approaches against a force insignificant in everything except their impudence in not running incontinently away—if this be evidence of generalship, then indeed was McClellan Napoleonic.

It will be remembered that the route to Richmond *via* the Peninsula was McClellan's favorite idea. Mr. Lincoln, acting, doubtless, upon consultation with competent military advisers, was opposed to it. The failure of the campaign illustrates the weakness of this idea, and it is further demonstrated by the success of the one upon the direct route which had its culmination at Appomattox. In undertaking, therefore, such a campaign—undertaking it, too; in opposition to the most authoritative views, involving, as it was supposed to do, the fate of the republic—one would suppose that a competent military commander would at least endeavor to know something of what he was about. Perhaps there are depths in military genius and military strategy which, to the common mind, are past finding out, but it would naturally occur to a traveler, about to set forth to a distant point, to endeavor to find out how he was going to get there. It would seem to be the part of a general intending to invade an enemy's country to definitely ascertain what the topography of that country was, and what facilities for movement existed. In this connection some of McClellan's observations are pertinent.

As for instance: "Maps, which had been prepared by the topographical engineers under General Wool's command, were furnished me, in which the Warwick River was represented as flowing parallel to but not crossing the road from Newport News to Williamsburg, making the so-called Mulberry Island a real island; and we had no information as to the true course of the Warwick *across* the Peninsula, nor of the formidable line of earthworks which it covered." And again: "In the commencement of the movement from Fort Monroe serious difficulties were encountered from the want of precise topographical information as to the country in advance. Correct local maps were not to be found, and the country, though known in its general feature, we found to be inaccurately described in essential particulars in the only maps and geographical memoirs or papers to which access could be had. Erroneous courses to streams and roads were frequently given, and no dependence could be placed on the information thus derived. This difficulty has been found to exist with respect to most portions of the State of Virginia, through which my military operations have extended.

Reconnaissances, frequently under fire, proved the only trustworthy sources of information. Negroes, however truthful their reports, possessed or were able to communicate very little accurate and no comprehensive topographical information." Mitchell's "Geography" therefore, as it appears, was entirely inadequate to the occasion, and that streams ran up instead of down, and that roads were promiscuous with reference to the points of compass, was doubtless confusing to a military chieftain who was surprised to discover that "no comprehensive topographical information" could be extracted from contrabands. His acquaintance, therefore, with the three following facts being imperfect—first, the number of the enemy he was about to confront ; second, the number of men he was about to confront them with ; third, the character of the country he was about to confront them on—there would appear to be eliminated from the military problem the three elementary factors which make it at all interesting.

If in all of McClellan's numerous letters, dispatches, and communications from the Peninsula there is anything that is at any time encouraging, bold, or even hopeful, it is exceedingly difficult to discover ; upon the contrary, his entire correspondence might be described as one continued wail. When in front of the five thousand men in buckram, spoken of, he writes, April 7th, "In consequence of the loss of Blenker's division and the First Corps, my force is possibly less than that of the enemy, while they have all the advantages of position" ; and in another part of the same : "With this army I could assault the enemy's works, and perhaps carry them ; but, were I in possession of their intrenchments and assailed by double my numbers, I should have no fears as to the result." On the 10th of May he represents to the Secretary of War that the enemy are collecting all the force they can, and concentrating their best troops ; that casualties and sickness are reducing his own numbers, and, "if I am not reënforced, I will be obliged to fight nearly double my numbers strongly intrenched." Four days afterward he repeats almost the same language. The enemy are always in excellent condition, while his army is being continually thinned out ; and fighting "double his numbers" is a favorite expression.

May 21st he says, "All accounts report their numbers as greatly exceeding our own." He impresses upon the Government that the rebels have made every preparation for a desperate battle in front of Richmond, and, from the frequency with which this sur-

prising information is repeated, we are led to ask, what else was expected?

It had been satisfactorily ascertained, as early as 1861, that the South had not seceded, nor had Southerners inaugurated rebellion, just for the fun of the thing. They were fearfully in earnest. If there was one characteristic for which they were more conspicuous than another it was that, day and night, in season and out of season, they were completely and thoroughly "desperate." And if the Peninsular campaign was evolved from any consciousness that anticipated the subjugation of Dixie, by measures so pacific that they would feel anxious to kiss the rod that smote them, evidently there was a mistake somewhere. And yet, with an invading army of a hundred thousand men, marshaled with all the pomp and circumstance of glorious war, within gunshot of the inner citadel of treason, information that a serious battle might be expected was of that kind which the press is accustomed to head-line as "important if true!"

But it would be tedious to follow in detail all the Peninsular dispatches which seem to breathe simply a spirit of despair. Their tenor is invariably the same: "I regard it as certain that the enemy will meet us with all his force on the Chickahominy. They can concentrate many more men than I have, and are collecting troops from all quarters. . . . Duty requires me to urge that every effort be made to reënforce me. . . . The enemy are concentrating all their available force to fight this army. . . . I can not bring into actual battle against the enemy more than eighty thousand men at the utmost, and with them I must attack in position, probably intrenched, a much larger force, perhaps double my numbers. . . . I ask for every man that the War Department can send me. . . . I believe that there is a great struggle before this army; but I am neither discouraged nor dismayed."

This is much like whistling in the dark.

It is not wonderful that this continued and distressful cry provoked from the amiable Mr. Lincoln the rather pungent remark, "I think the time is near when you must either attack Richmond or give up the job and come to the defense of Washington."

These were the kind of dispatches that were being daily sent to Washington, up to the time that the Great Commander, astraddle of the Chickahominy, had thrown his right wing clear into the air, so that it was "resting," as it is termed, in military parlance, on Stonewall Jackson, who at the proper time inaugurated the famous

"change of base," as it is still called—a movement which the Northern public for a few weeks believed was a triumph in military strategy, but which fuller knowledge made somewhat less glorious.

Another General, under circumstances perhaps quite as difficult as those under review, dispatched to his Government, "I intend to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer."

Before leaving the "change of base," it is desirable to form some idea, approximate at least, as to the relative forces in the Peninsular campaign.

The number of men composing the Army of the Potomac, from the official returns (report of Committee on the Conduct of the War, vol. i, p. 323), was—present for duty April 30, 1862 (112,392), one hundred and twelve thousand three hundred and ninety-two. This was a few days before McClellan telegraphed to the Secretary of War (vol. i, Supplement to "Rebellion Record," p. 564), "If I am not reënforced, it is probable that I will be obliged to fight nearly double my numbers, strongly intrenched." From report of the same committee, vol. i, p. 337, there were present for duty June 20, 1862 (115,102) one hundred and fifteen thousand one hundred and two. On the 20th July, 1862, there were present for duty, same report, vol. i, p. 344, (101,691) one hundred and one thousand six hundred and ninety-one. These reports were all made by Assistant Adjutant-General Seth Williams, signed by General McClellan, and there is, therefore, a grave suspicion that they are correct and entirely reliable.

In a book published by Colonel W. H. Taylor, a staff-officer of General Lee, entitled "Four Years with General Lee," he says (page 49) that a statement on file in the archives-office of the rebel War Department shows that, on the 21st of May, 1862, General Johnston had present for duty (53,688) fifty-three thousand six hundred and eighty-eight; to those he states certain other numbers should be added, making that force, on the 31st of May, 1862 (62,696), sixty-two thousand six hundred and ninety-six. At the battle of Seven Pines, or Fair Oaks, Johnston fell severely wounded, when Lee assumed command. Deducting the losses of that affair, as taken from official reports, Taylor gives Lee's effective force as (56,612) fifty-six thousand six hundred and twelve. Previous to the seven days' battles Lee was reënforced, increasing his numbers to (80,762) eighty thousand seven hundred and sixty-two. The reports of the rebel division commanders give about the same result, as shown in "Reports of the Operations of the Army of

Northern Virginia under General Lee, published by authority of the Confederate Congress" (vol. i, pp. 151-368, 190, 371-385, 173, 187, 270).

McClellan's report of killed, wounded, and missing, from the 26th of June to the 1st of July inclusive, which takes in the whole series of battles, including Malvern Hill, was (15,249) fifteen thousand two hundred and forty-nine. (See his report, Supplement to "Rebellion Record," p. 593.) Deduct this loss from his returns of June 20th, and he still had near (100,000) one hundred thousand men. In his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War (vol. i, p. 437), he says he had eighty-five thousand or ninety thousand, so that at the end of the fight he had more than Lee at the beginning. The change of base, therefore, was a peculiar feature of vigorous warfare, if the comparison of numbers be at all reliable. If it was considered at the time as a brilliant and successful operation by either McClellan or the Government, both had a queer style of correspondence upon the subject.

McClellan, June 28th, says: "Our men did all that men could do, all that soldiers could accomplish, but they were overwhelmed by vastly superior numbers, even after I brought my last reserves into action. The loss on both sides is terrible. I believe it will prove to be the most desperate battle of the war. The sad remnants of my men behave as men. . . . I have not a man in reserve, and shall be glad to cover my retreat and save the material and *personnel* of the army. . . . If we have lost the day, we have yet preserved our honor, and no one need blush for the Army of the Potomac. I have lost this battle because my force was too small. . . . If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you, or to any other persons in Washington. You have done your best to destroy this army."

The first remark that one is disposed to make, in contemplating such a dispatch as this, is somewhat of the following nature:

Considering that it was addressed to the Secretary of War, the immediate representative of the President, who is the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and by an inferior, at least in rank, the perfect good temper, the entire respect, the calm philosophy, the unshaken courage which it evidences, and the spirit of gentle subordination with which it is redolent, become manifest as soon as mentioned.

And again, if this be the language of a successful chieftain just achieving a "change of base," the unlearned in military terms

would seek to know the precise meaning of that portentous phrase. Upon an historic American occasion, when the British marched up Bunker Hill, and then went down again two or three several times with entire unanimity and perceptible precipitation, they undoubtedly effected a "change of base." Speak of "the retreat from Moscow," and a Frenchman gnashes his teeth at the profanation offered to what the merry nation still delight to honor as "un grand *rétrograde mouvement*." Were the old Napoleon alive, perhaps he might avail himself of the nomenclature of the young one.

While the base was in process of changing, evidently not aware what a brilliant triumph was being thrust upon him, Mr. Lincoln, June 28th, telegraphed, in reply to the dispatch last quoted, "Save your army at all events." July 1st the General says: "My men are completely exhausted, and I dread the result if we are attacked to-day by fresh troops. . . . I now pray for time."

July 1st Mr. Lincoln says: "If you are not strong enough to face the enemy, you must find a place of security, and wait, and rest, and repair. Maintain your ground if you can, but save the army at all events." And the next day, "Save the army, material, and *personnel*."

Whatever it may be called, the movement to the James was the running away of a vastly superior force from a vastly inferior one, and the panic created occasioned a perfect stampede of all the intellectual and moral qualities of the Union leader. He even issued an order for the destruction of the baggage of officers and men. Candor requires the statement that General McClellan says he does not remember issuing such order. The evidence on the point is the testimony of Lieutenant-Colonel S. B. Alexander (1 Com. Cond. War, p. 592). He states that, on the afternoon of the 28th, he was sent for by McClellan, and repaired to headquarters, then at Savage Station. He was there shown a printed order directing the destruction of the baggage of the officers and men, and "I think also the camp equipage; appealing to the officers and men to submit to this privation, because it would be only temporary—only for a few days." Alexander remonstrated with McClellan against issuing such an order, on the ground that it would demoralize both officers and men, and "would tell them more plainly than in any other way that they were a defeated army, and running for their lives."

The testimony of a witness, who states that he saw this order, is not countervailed by that of General McClellan, who assevers that he does not remember it.

There is one statement in the April article to which attention will now be given: "Every part of the army which he had lately commanded went forward to be under Pope's command. McClellan took nothing with him but his personal staff, a few orderlies, and the infantry guard of his headquarters—about five hundred men, all told. He encamped with them at Alexandria, in a field near the river, about half a mile above the town, and reported for orders. There he was employed in forwarding troops and ammunition to Pope until the 30th." In his report of October 15, 1862, General McClellan says: "The troops composing the Army of the Potomac were meanwhile ordered forward to reënforce the army under General Pope. So completely was this order carried out, that on the 30th of August I had remaining under my command only a camp-guard of about one hundred men. Everything else had been sent to reënforce General Pope. In addition, I exhausted all the means at my disposal to forward supplies to that officer, my own headquarter teams even being used for that purpose."

As General Pope was fighting the battles which involved the safety of Washington, the above statements show that General McClellan is fairly entitled to be termed the "General who saved the capital," and it will therefore be our purpose to demonstrate the absolute verity of those statements.

On the 3d of August Halleck telegraphed McClellan that it was determined to withdraw his army to Aquia Creek, and that he must take immediate steps to that end. Against this McClellan protested, but the order was repeated the next day. Full advice as to the importance of this action was given, for on August 9th Halleck telegraphs: "I am of the opinion that the enemy is massing his forces in front of Generals Pope and Burnside, and that he expects to crush them, and move forward to the Potomac. You must send reënforcements instantly to Aquia Creek. Considering the amount of transportation at your disposal, your delay is not satisfactory. You must move with all possible celerity." McClellan asserts that there has not been an hour's delay. Again, on August 10th, Halleck shows the dangerous emergency: "The enemy is crossing the Rapidan in large force. They are fighting General Pope to-day. There must be no further delay in your movements; that which has already occurred was entirely unexpected, and must be satisfactorily explained. Let not a moment's time be lost, and telegraph me daily what progress you have made in executing the order to

transfer your troops." McClellan again insists that there has been no delay.

McClellan reached Aquia Creek August 24th, and reported to Halleck for orders. The battle of second Bull Run was on the 29th and 30th of August.

The following series of remarkable dispatches shows the urgent, pressing commands of the General-in-Chief to reënforce Pope ; and they also show how they were obeyed by the General who was in the process of "saving the capital" :

At 11 A. M., August 26th, Halleck telegraphs, "General Franklin's corps will march as soon as it receives transportation."

"Transportation" is generally the rock upon which all great military commanders split. It is the unfailing excuse for everything that goes wrong. If a given movement fails of successful accomplishment, the stereotyped reply is given, "Want of transportation," probably meaning that the Government mules had not breakfasted in time for the contemplated operations. But in this case the mules can not be held responsible, for, in a dispatch of Halleck's, dated August 30th, speaking of Franklin's failure to move, he says, "Moreover, I learned last night that the quartermaster's department would have given him plenty of transportation if he had applied for it at any time since his arrival at Alexandria."

On the 27th Halleck says : "Porter reports a general battle imminent. Franklin's corps should move out by forced marches, carrying three or four days' provisions, and to be supplied as far as possible by railroad." The battle-field was not many miles from Alexandria.

Upon this same 27th Ewell's division of Jackson's corps had struck Hooker, and a sharp fight took place. The urgency was plainly indicated. Forced marches and carrying provisions on their backs impart the notion that the men are needed, and needed quickly. But did Franklin go ? Did he even start ? Did he make a pretense of starting ? Not at all. He was not there for any such purpose ; and, therefore, upon the same day, at ten o'clock A. M., Halleck again telegraphs, "Franklin's corps should move in that direction (Manassas) as soon as possible." To which we have this distinguished reply from General McClellan, "I have sent orders to Franklin to prepare to march with his corps at once, and to repair here in person to inform me as to his means of transportation." Transportation again ! How not to do it. Franklin is ordered to

"prepare" to march, and by "preparation" McClellan seems to have understood the waiting until it was just a little too late.

The transportation question must have been of fearful proportions, in view of the fact that the march to be made was about twenty miles. It was a question which required a council of war, which McClellan and Franklin proceeded to hold, arriving at the conclusion that, under the circumstances, nothing whatever could under any possibility be done. For, at 12.5 P. M. of the same day, McClellan again telegraphs: "My aide has just returned from General Franklin's camp; reports Generals Franklin, Smith, and Slocum are all in Washington." A proper place for corps commanders to be, who have been ordered to make forced marches to meet an enemy! In the same dispatch, McClellan further says, "He (my aide) gave the order to the next in rank to place the corps in readiness to move at once." No marching—no moving—no doing anything—but the problem of eternal indefiniteness—getting ready to do something. Halleck's directions were to march, and march at once—directions given at 11 A. M. of the 26th. It is now 12.5 P. M. of the 27th. Twenty-five hours and five minutes have passed, and the corps is still ordered to get ready.

At 1.15 of the 27th McClellan says: "Franklin's artillery have no horses except for four guns without caissons. I can pick up no cavalry. In view of these facts will it not be well to push Sumner's corps here by water as rapidly as possible, to make immediate arrangements for placing the works in front of Washington in an efficient state of defense? I have no means of knowing the enemy's force between Pope and ourselves. Can Franklin without his artillery or cavalry effect any useful purpose in front? Should not Burnside take steps at once to evacuate Falmouth and Aquia, at the same time covering the retreat of any of Pope's troops who may fall back in that direction? I do not see that we have force enough in hand to form a connection with Pope, whose exact position we do not know. Are we safe in the direction of the Valley?"

This dispatch shows that he knew Jackson to be between Pope and himself, in exactly the position to be caught and crushed to powder. Had Franklin's corps promptly marched, that result would have inevitably followed. But did the Peninsular chieftain seize the golden opportunity? Did he send a man to the relief of his comrades in arms? Not one! He occupies himself with furnishing excuses to justify complete inaction. There are no horses for the artillery, or the mules are on a strike. He calls instant attention

to every possible question but the vital one of succoring Pope. He makes suggestions, the effect of which is, that the energies of the Government shall be engaged in other matters than those going on at the battle-field in front ; and, had Halleck heeded those suggestions, the Army of the Potomac would again have been set to work digging holes in the ground. Singularly enough, he says that, though he does not know the force of the enemy between "Pope and ourselves," still we have not force enough to "form a connection with Pope." It would be undignified to call this subterfuge, and, as Mrs. Nickleby said, "let us be genteel or die." But that prescience is wonderful which, though ignorant of the numbers before it, is still certain that its own is unequal to an attack. "The retreat of any of General Pope's troops !" Was that what he was expecting ? Was that what he was manœuvring for ?

Still again upon the 27th—a day of fearful importance, when the Government was straining every nerve to save itself from destruction—upon the 27th Halleck once more telegraphs : "The enemy seem to be trying to turn Pope's left. Is there no way of communicating with him ?" Is this the cry of despair ? Is it the cry for succor to the only hand that can help, to the only arm that outstretched can save, with the consciousness that that hand will be stayed and that arm not raised ? "Hope for a season bade the world farewell."

So late as 6 P. M. of the 27th McClellan says : "I now have at my disposal about ten thousand of Franklin's corps, about twenty-eight hundred of General Tyler's brigade, and Colonel Tyler's First Connecticut Artillery, which I recommend should be held in hand for the defense of Washington." In face of the peremptory orders, as already given, he has the coolness to say, "If you wish me to order any part of this force to the front, it is in readiness to march at a moment's notice to any point you may indicate."

And thus the 27th of August passes into the twilight of history, and not yet has McClellan marshaled his hosts for the relief of the fighting braves upon the plains of Manassas.

August 28th dawns upon the strife. Halleck telegraphs to Franklin : "On parting with General McClellan, about two o'clock this morning, it was understood that you were to move with your corps to-day toward Manassas Junction to drive the enemy from the railroad. I have just learned that the General has not yet returned to Alexandria. If you have not received his order, act on this."

Did General Franklin "act on this" order? Did he move? Did he move on the 28th? Not a bit of it, although at 11 A. M. of the 26th his corps had been ordered to march at once. As General Franklin was a subordinate, it is to be supposed that he would have obeyed the behests of highest authority, had not some unseen and malign influence restrained him. It is only inferable that General Franklin handed this dispatch over to McClellan, who directed him not to comply.

No other influence is justifiable from the facts, for this is McClellan's reply, sent at 1 P. M., and it is given in full :

ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA, August 26, 1862.—1 P. M.

Your dispatch to Franklin received. I have been doing all possible to hurry artillery and cavalry. The moment Franklin can be started with a reasonable amount of artillery he shall go. In the mean time see Whipple's dispatch. Something must be done in that direction. Please see Barnard, and be sure that the works toward the chain-bridge are perfectly secure. I look upon these works, especially Ethan Allen and Marcy, as of the first importance. I have heard incidentally that there is no garrison in Ethan Allen, but presume it is a mistake. I have just conversed with Colonel Holabin, and think the enemy is in so much force near Manassas as to make it necessary for us to move in force.

GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN,
Major-General commanding.

General H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Upon reading this dispatch and reply, the conclusion forces itself that McClellan proposed not only to do nothing himself, but not to allow any one else to do anything. From a condition of passive inactivity, he now proceeds to a state of active interference, to accomplish prevention. Let alone, Franklin would have been compelled to go ahead, or run the risk of being shot ; and, now that there is actual danger of prompt measures being taken, McClellan is the man who puts a quietus on the entire proceeding. But this reply will bear further contemplation. Franklin is not ready. As soon as he has cannon he shall go ! "A reasonable amount of artillery" ! This was the very force which the day before McClellan had stated was ready "to march at a moment's notice" ; and there is nothing to show that his "artillery" had, in the mean time, been captured by the enemy or sold for old iron.

The *ensemble* of this whole reply is profoundly impressive. The vast number of things in which General McClellan's powerful mind is patriotically interested is wonderful. The vital business, at the

front, the crisis and climax of destiny, does not arrest the fleeting thought. "Whipple's dispatch" overburdens the intellect. Whether Whipple was discoursing upon the number of baked beans the army should consume upon the morrow, or was eloquent upon some other equally important subject, matters not. Moreover, there was "Barnard" and the "chain-bridge," "works" which needed security. "Works" were General McClellan's strong point. He never had any faith without works, and his mind tended so strongly in this direction that he forgot all else. Of the various matters in this reply, evidently demanding the attention of the General-in-Chief, there is no mention of Pope.

There is nothing said of the situation upon which, in reality, all depended, and in comparison with which Whipple and the chain-bridge were mere insignificances. The only approximation is the statement that there is such a force at Manassas that we ought "to move in force"—a remarkable discovery to be made at this period of time, but still one that does not quicken the apathy that had settled upon the brain and will of the commander of the Army of the Potomac. In reading this reply dispassionately, remembering the fearful circumstances of the hour, does it read as coming from one whose whole soul and heart were enlisted in the service of his country?

August 28th, at 3.30, Halleck says, "Not a moment must be lost in pushing as large force as possible toward Manassas so as to communicate with Pope before the enemy is reënforced." Halleck sees, Halleck knows the *point d'appui*. Pope is the man. On him rest the hopes of the hour, the day, the age. On that name Halleck rings the changes day after day. But the trumpet-call from the "General-in-Chief" falls upon ears that are dull—dull and heavy to sounds that should have touched every chord of a soldier's heart, and caused his blood to bound with eagerness for the fray. All other things are forgotten by the General-in-Chief. Ethan Allen, chain-bridge, works, are thrown to the winds. Pope was the man to be helped. On the point of his sword the battle balanced. It was Pope whom Halleck on August 21st had ordered: "Dispute every inch of ground, and fight like the devil, till we can reënforce you. Forty-eight hours more, and we can make you strong enough. Don't yield an inch if you can help it." And Pope obeyed his orders to "fight like the devil!" Impious simile! But, had his Satanic Majesty been a witness to the fact in those fields of heroism and carnage, he would have recognized the likeness upon the instant.

At 4.10 McClellan replies : " General Franklin is with me here. I will know in a few minutes the condition of artillery and cavalry. We are not yet in a condition to move ; may be by to-morrow morning." At 4.45 he says : " Your dispatch received. Neither Franklin's nor Sumner's corps is now in condition to move and fight a battle. It would be a sacrifice to send them out now. I have sent aides to ascertain."

Just here, perhaps, it may be as well to see what " Old Bull " Sumner says of these matters : " I embarked, as I have stated, at Newport News. When I arrived at Aquia Creek I immediately detached one of my brigades by railroad, and they advanced to Fredericksburg. Before I could debark all my command, I received orders to proceed directly to Alexandria. I therefore reëmbarked the brigade, and proceeded up the river to Alexandria. I landed there, and took possession of my former camp on the Little River Turnpike, about two miles from town. I remained there twenty-four hours. I was then ordered to retrace my steps through Alexandria, and to march with my command up to the Aqueduct bridge at Georgetown. I made the march during the night, and placed my troops in bivouac near that bridge the next forenoon. When I had been there about three hours I received an order to move with my command as rapidly as possible. . . . If I had been ordered to advance right on from Alexandria by the Little River Turnpike, I should have been in that second Bull Run battle with my whole force. As it was, I lost some forty-eight hours by remaining in camp for a time near Alexandria, and then marching up to the Aqueduct bridge." . . .

Question. " In your judgment, what would have been the effect had you immediately, upon landing at Alexandria, been ordered to join General Pope with your command ? Would it not have saved his army from defeat, and prevented the rebels from invading Maryland ? "

Answer. " I can say this : that had I, upon landing at Alexandria, been ordered forward immediately, I should have been in the second Bull Run battle with my corps."

Question. " How many men had you in your corps at that time ? "

Answer. " About ten thousand, I presume."

Question. " Under whose orders were you acting, before you communicated with General Pope ? "

Answer. " Under orders from General McClellan—orders trans-

mitted through him from General Halleck." (1 Committee on the Conduct of the War, p. 367.)

The old veteran did not seem to know that his corps was in no "condition to move and fight a battle." Upon the other hand, had he received the orders, he would "have been in the second Bull Run battle with my corps." Condition or no condition, he was ready for a fight, waiting like a hound in the leash for the order to spring. He waited forty-eight hours, the thunder of battle in his ears, the roar of cannon shaking the windows in houses at Alexandria, but the order did not come. McClellan did not give it, but was holding him back with flimsy pretexts of not being ready.

Herman Haupt was master of transportation, in charge of moving troops and supplies by rail from Alexandria to the front. He states that he first met McClellan at Alexandria August 27th. "While here I communicated to him the information that General Taylor had made an attack upon a force of the enemy at Manassas, had suffered a repulse, and was wounded; that Colonel Scammon was holding Bull Run bridge with a force of fifteen hundred men."

Question. "What action did General McClellan take upon the information which you communicated?"

Answer. "He decided that it would not be safe to send an expedition to reënforce the command of General Scammon until he could get further information of the number and position of the enemy." This was on the 27th, after McClellan had received the order from Halleck, "Franklin's corps should march in direction (Manassas) as soon as possible"; to which McClellan replies at 10.40 that he had ordered Franklin to "prepare to march." Ten minutes afterward, or 10.50 A. M., of the 27th, Halleck telegraphs Haupt to see McClellan. The interview takes place, with the result above stated, and in the face of the order from his superior, with the reply made indicating his intention to comply, he deliberately informs Haupt that "it would not be safe" to send out an expedition as he had been ordered. In this interview Haupt further says:

Question. "Did you recommend that the command should be reënforced?"

Answer. "I was very anxious that it should be either reënforced or relieved. I wished to bring off the remainder of General Taylor's command, and, if I had not found General McClellan, would certainly have sent out a force that afternoon."

Question. "Had you reason to believe that this movement could have been made successfully?"

Answer. "I thought the circumstances were such as to justify some risk, and, as General McClellan did not seem willing to send a force for the reasons assigned, I determined to assume the responsibility of making a reconnaissance the following morning unless positively forbidden. I accordingly sent General McClellan the following telegram :"

August 27, 1862.

I propose to start at four o'clock, precisely, a wrecking and construction train bound for Bull Run, also a forage train and a subsistence train. It is, perhaps, proper that two hundred good skirmishers should be sent with the trains, who should be at the depot at Alexandria before 4 A. M. to-morrow morning. General Pope will be notified by courier to-night to have his wagons ready at Sangster's Station by daylight to-morrow. If the troops are not here by 4 A. M. we purpose to go ahead without them.

Major-General McCLELLAN.

H. HAUPT."

(Parenthetically we pause to do reverence to the pluck of the gallant Haupt. In the face of a danger that appalled "the General who saved the capital," and froze him into a state of timorous quiescence, Haupt proposed "to go ahead without them.")

Haupt continues, "No reply having been received within the time designated, I sent out the train." (1 Committee on the Conduct of the War, p. 379.) Haupt makes this further statement, in the same volume, p. 384 :

Question. "Were the troops of the Army of the Potomac in condition for service when landed at Alexandria ?"

Answer. "The troops were fed from the transports, and could have marched to Manassas in one fourth the time required to reach that point by waiting for transportation ; besides, if the troops had marched, they could have better supported each other. The railroad, with the frequent breaks from rebel raids, was taxed nearly to its capacity to furnish supplies. I believe that, if the troops, when landed from the transports, had been marched immediately to Manassas instead of waiting several days for rail transportation, they could have rendered efficient support to General Pope, and would, no doubt, have changed the result of the contest by giving us a decisive victory, but I don't know who was responsible for this delay ; there may have been reasons for not moving which I did not understand."

It will be remembered that Jackson, with that headlong daring which partook more of valor than discretion, had come through Thoroughfare Gap at least two days ahead of the rest of Lee's

army. On the afternoon of the 27th he had a fight with Hooker, and was exactly between Pope and Washington. On the night of the 27th he burned Manassas Junction, and moved north through Centreville. If anything is plain, it is that, had Franklin's corps been pushed promptly out as ordered, he would have met Jackson face to face. Thus brought to a stand, Pope's whole army would have been upon his rear on the 28th, with Lee and Longstreet a day's march away.

But let us resume the dispatches of the 28th, for upon that day Gibbon had his fight, and then followed the battles of the 29th and 30th.

At 8.40 P. M. of the 28th Halleck telegraphs: "There must be no further delay in moving Franklin's corps toward Manassas. They must go to-morrow morning, ready or not ready. If we delay too long to get ready, there will be no necessity to go at all; for Pope will either be defeated or victorious without our aid. If there is a want of wagons, the men must carry provisions with them till the wagons can come to their relief."

It is noticeable that this dispatch, as well as the previous one of 4.45, and also others, do not appear in McClellan's report as published in Supplement to "Rebel Record," p. 612. McClellan answers: "Franklin's corps has been ordered to march at six (6) o'clock to-morrow morning. Sumner has about (14,000) fourteen thousand infantry, without cavalry or artillery, here. Cox's brigade of four regiments is here, with two batteries of artillery; men of two regiments, much fatigued, came to-day. Tyler's brigade, of three new regiments but little drilled, is also here. All these troops will be ordered to hold themselves ready to march to-morrow morning; and all except Franklin to await further orders. If you wish any of them to move toward Manassas, please inform me.

. . . . Reports numerous, from various sources, that Lee and Stuart with large forces are at Manassas; that the enemy, with one hundred and twenty thousand men, intend advancing on the forts near Arlington and chain-bridge, with a view to attacking Washington and Baltimore."

This dispatch shows that he was holding in hand at least thirty thousand men. All this day of the 28th, all the preceding day of the 27th, Halleck had been ordering him to send men forward, and he complacently says, "If you wish any of them to move, please inform me."

To a true soldier, there was no need of any such order. The

roar of battle sounding in his ears should have been enough to have called him to the front, or at least to have induced him to let his men go.

August 29th, at 10.30 A. M., he says: "Franklin's corps is in motion; started about six (6) A. M. I can give him but two squadrons of cavalry. . . . If Sumner moves in support of Franklin, it leaves us without any reliable troops in and near Washington; yet Franklin is too much alone. What shall be done? . . . Franklin has but forty rounds of ammunition, and no wagons to move more. I do not think Franklin is in a position to accomplish much if he meets strong resistance. I should not have moved him but for your pressing order of last night." An hour and a half after, at 12 M., he says: "Do you wish the movement of Franklin's corps to continue? He is without reserve ammunition and without transportation." A few moments later he telegraphs: "Franklin has only between ten thousand and eleven thousand ready for duty. How far do you wish this force to advance?" At 1 P. M. he says, "Shall I do as seems best to me with all the troops in this vicinity, including Franklin, who I really think ought not, under the present circumstances, to proceed beyond Anandale?"

General Halleck must have been possessed of an angelic temper to be receiving this kind of dispatches when, two days before, he had ordered Franklin to move at once, and move to Manassas; and, indeed, his ire does seem to begin to awaken, in at least some small degree, for he replies at 3 P. M.: "I want Franklin's corps to go far enough to find out something about the enemy. . . . Our people *must* move more rapidly and find out where the enemy is. I am tired of guesses."

The next dispatch is, perhaps, the most remarkable of any in all this series of remarkable documents. It was sent at 2.45 P. M. of the 29th:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC NEAR ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA,
August 29, 1862, 2.45 P. M.

The last news I received from the direction of Manassas was from stragglers, to the effect that the enemy were evacuating Centreville, and retiring toward Thoroughfare Gap. This is by no means reliable.

I am clear that one of two courses should be adopted: first, to concentrate all our available forces to open communication with Pope; second, to leave Pope to get out of his scrape, and at once use all our means to make the capital perfectly safe. No middle course will answer now. Tell me what you wish me to do, and I will do all in my power to accomplish it. I wish to know what my orders and authority are. I ask for nothing, but will

obey whatever orders you give. I only ask a prompt decision, that I may at once give the necessary orders. It will not do to delay longer.

GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN, *Major-General*.

A. LINCOLN, *President*.

Under all the circumstances of the case—with a continuous series of battles raging for two days within his immediate hearing, battles upon which the fate of the republic hung, battles that must result as he chose they should result, by his giving or withdrawing aid, with the orders from headquarters that had been raining on him, urging, commanding him to render that aid upon the instant—it is difficult to speak of this dispatch and preserve equanimity. “To open communication with Pope” was what he was brought from the Peninsula for. It was what his superiors had directed him to do, not once, nor twice, nor thrice, but at least six times within forty-eight hours. It is not pretended that McClellan did not understand the English language; and, with all this multiplication of orders before him, he suggests “to open communication with Pope,” as though the idea had not occurred to him before—as though he were broaching a novelty to General Halleck! It is now, however, a proposition that is “clear” to him.

The next suggestion is “to leave Pope to get out of his scrape.”

Was ever such proposition before made by a soldier in regard to a companion in arms? Had he put those words into actual deeds instead! Had he upon the field of battle run away from his compatriots and left them “to get out of their scrape,” he would have been shot for his cowardice, or hung for his treachery. He is not guilty of these things, for, although the willingness is evinced, the opportunity is not afforded.

When he says to the President that he only wants to know what to do and will do it, he exhibits a sarcastic irony that shows him to be an artist in language. Having for two whole days disobeyed every order sent him, he declares his readiness to “obey whatever orders you give.”

Up to this time it appears that absolutely nothing has been done. McClellan is idling away his time in Alexandria, receiving orders that, as far as any practical result is concerned, might just as well have been sent to the Sandwich Islands. At 7.50 P. M. Halleck again telegraphs: “You will immediately send construction trains and guards to repair railroad to Manassas. Let there be no delay in this. I have just been told that Franklin’s corps stopped at Anandale, and that he was this evening in Alexandria. This is

all contrary to my orders. Investigate and report the fact of this disobedience. That corps *must* push forward, as I directed, to protect the railroad and open communication with Manassas."

McClellan replies: "It was not safe for Franklin to move beyond Anandale, under the circumstances, until we knew what was at Vienna. General Franklin remained here until about 1 P. M., endeavoring to arrange for supplies for his command. I am responsible for both these circumstances, and do not see that either was in disobedience to your orders. Please give distinct orders in reference to Franklin's movements of to-morrow. . . . In regard to to-morrow's movements I desire definite instructions, as it is not agreeable to me to be accused of disobeying orders when I have simply exercised the discretion you committed to me."

On the 30th, at 9.40, Halleck again telegraphs: "I am by no means satisfied with General Franklin's march of yesterday, considering the circumstances of the case. He was very wrong in stopping at Anandale. Moreover, I learned last night that the quartermaster's department would have given him plenty of transportation if he had applied for it any time since his arrival at Alexandria. He knew the importance of opening communication with General Pope's army, and should have acted more promptly."

At 12.20 Halleck still telegraphs, "Send the troops where the fighting is."

At 2.15 he says: "Franklin's and all of Sumner's corps should be pushed forward with all possible dispatch. They must use their legs and make forced marches."

At 1.10 P. M. of the 30th McClellan says to Halleck, "I know nothing of the caliber of Pope's artillery." In his report (Supplement to "Rebellion Record," p. 609) upon August 21st, he had telegraphed Halleck from Fort Monroe, "I have ample supplies of ammunition for infantry and artillery, and will have it up in time. I can supply any deficiency that may exist in General Pope's army."

At 10.10 P. M. of the 30th Halleck telegraphs: "All of Sumner's corps on the south side of the river not actually required in the forts should march to Pope's relief. . . . Franklin should also be hurried on to reinforce Pope."

This closes the record of those momentous days. It is a record of shuffling, of evasion; of pretending to do and doing nothing—a semblance of action without action, that Mr. Greeley, in his chapter on the subject, characterizes as "McClellan marking time."

It is a record of Halleck's continuous and persistent attempts to

succor the beleaguered forces of the nation ; a record of continuous, persistent thwarting of those attempts. For four days, beginning with the 27th, fighting had been going on, and the thunder of the captains and the shouting were heard in the streets of Washington. Although portions of the Army of the Potomac reached General Pope before McClellan arrived at Alexandria, yet after that date not a man from him came upon the field of battle until the strife was over. The crisis was past, the army fell back to Washington, and came under McClellan's command. This result could not have followed had Pope been the victor, and Lee crushed upon the field of Manassas. The successful General would have been the man for the emergency, and McClellan's star would have set in obscurity. It is not, perhaps, given us to divine what might have been ; but General Halleck, who supervised the whole field of operations in that important campaign, is thus questioned : "Had the army of the Peninsula been brought to coöperate with the Army of Virginia with the utmost energy that circumstances would have permitted, in your judgment as a military man, would it not have resulted in our victory instead of our defeat ?"

Answer. "I thought so at the time and still think so." (1 Committee on the Conduct of the War, p. 454.)

If, in view of all these dispatches, it can be shown wherein McClellan did anything to "save the capital," he should have the full benefit of all his patriotic efforts. The reports of the Army of the Potomac while on the Peninsula, above referred to, show that during all that time he had never less than one hundred thousand men present for duty ; of all this large army Reynolds's division and the corps of Heintzelman and Porter, twenty thousand five hundred strong, were the only ones that joined General Pope in time to take part in the fighting. After McClellan came on the scene of action at Alexandria, great care was taken that not another musket should go forward, except at just such time and at just such place as should effectually insure its arrival precisely too late ; and under just such circumstances as should "leave Pope to get out of his scrape."

Had this been the objective point of the campaign, military genius could have accomplished no more thorough method of obtaining the desired end than that which was adopted.

This written record demonstrating as it does that the chief actor in these events purposely withheld reënforcements from his struggling countrymen, his motive for so doing is quite apparent.

The failure of the Peninsular campaign being complete and overwhelming, the only problem remaining was, how to get McClellan and his army away alive. The Government and the North being in a state of mind bordering upon despair over the great disasters, it is plain that their author was in a fair way of being speedily shelved. The new officer who had come from the West, and had shown a zeal and aptitude for fighting in strongest possible contrast with the inefficient commander of the Army of the Potomac, in case of success, could not have failed to supersede the General who, with unlimited resources at his disposal, had only insured unlimited supply of defeat.

It is not believed that McClellan was a traitor. In contemplation of his own fortunes, he had lost sight of all other interests, and that it was his premeditated and foreordained purpose that Pope should be defeated and driven back to Alexandria, that he might again come into command, like a phoenix rising from the ashes of his country's woes, is an inference not to be resisted, upon reading his own words during these days of trial. It was the inference that irresistibly forced itself upon the minds of Mr. Lincoln and his Cabinet at the time, and McClellan himself records the evidence in his own reports. It is the record of the shame, the humiliation of this great republic, when it prostrated itself in the dust before the man whom it believed to be untrustworthy, and in sackcloth and ashes besought him to be true to the national flag.

It was upon the 1st of September. The fighting was over. The wrong had been done, and it was too late now for remedy. The report states: "The President informed me that he had reason to believe that the Army of the Potomac was not cheerfully coöperating with and supporting General Pope; and that he had always been a friend of mine, and now asked me, as a special favor, to use my influence to correct this state of things." Does history relate anything comparable to this? This was the President of the United States!

The immediate presence was the awful question whether there was any United States or not! While the whole fabric was tottering under the earthquake of rebellion, the Chief Magistrate implores of the subordinate he had made famous to correct what, if true, was simple treason.

Of this situation, Draper's "History of the Civil War" says: "Though there was never purer patriotism than that which animated the soldiers of the Army of the Potomac, that army had been

brought, through the influence of officers who surrounded General McClellan, into a most dangerous condition—dangerous to the best interests of the nation—of having a wish of its own, and that wish in opposition to the convictions of the Government. In armies it is but a short step from the profession of a wish to the expression of a will. Perhaps at no period of the war were thoughtful men more deeply alarmed for the future of the nation than when they heard of the restoration of McClellan to command and recognized the unmistakable constraint under which the Government had acted.”

The report continues (Supplement to “Rebellion Record,” p. 617): “The President, who was much moved, asked me to telegraph to Fitz John Porter, or some other of my friends, and try to do away with any feeling that might exist; adding that I could rectify the feeling, and no one else could.”

The ears tingle that hear it, but the Government was afraid of McClellan, although they were the only individuals in whose breasts he ever awakened that sentiment. Graciously complying with the Presidential request, a dispatch is sent to Fitz John Porter. It is a dispatch breathing the spirit of patriotism. It is full of noble ardor—very full, almost to bursting. Porter’s reply also breathes the spirit of patriotism. It is also full of noble ardor—more so than the other one. It is so strong in these respects as to be admirable. Porter says, “You may rest assured that all your friends, as well as every lover of his country, will ever give, as they have given, to General Pope their cordial coöperation and constant support in the execution of all orders and plans.” “As they have given”! Porter was the man who, with a splendid corps of fresh troops, lay all day in sight and sound of battle, without lifting a finger to the rescue, except to retreat, because he thought his friends were getting the worst of it. “As they have given!”

If this reply is read with the proper emphasis on these words, and appropriate facial expression, it is at once seen that Fitz John Porter takes rank with Artemus Ward as among the first of American humorists. It may be possible that Mr. Lincoln and his Cabinet were wrong in believing McClellan responsible for all this failure and disaster in front of Washington. The judgment of history must determine.

Pope had been left “to get out of his scrape.” He had been summoned from the West to render such assistance to the Government as was possible, in extricating the Army of the Potomac and

its incompetent chief from the swamps of the Chickahominy, when the latter was calling for reinforcements "rather over than under one hundred thousand men." There is probably not an instance in the annals of war where a forlorn hope was organized and sent forth on an expedition of self-immolation under such circumstances as that which surrounded the "Army of Virginia." From the beginning its leader was thoroughly aware that the future had in store for him no success in deeds of arms. Gladly would he have avoided the duty imposed upon him, but the sacrifice was demanded, and the victim did not shrink. At no time did he entertain a thought of victory, and yet it was necessary for him to assume the rôle of prospective conqueror, to deceive if possible the enemy opposed to him. The game of "bluff" was adopted with premeditation as a regular part of the programme, with an entire knowledge of the obloquy that such a course must entail. It was loudly given out that an advance on Richmond was in instant contemplation, and that nothing could stay the onward progress of a force altogether adequate to the occasion. It was a *ruse de guerre*, and it succeeded; for the rebel authorities were alarmed, the hosts of the Peninsula were forgotten, and the new foe occupied the entire field of vision.

Those who choose to examine the Northern papers of July and August, 1862, can not fail to observe how the trumpets were sounded and the cymbals were clashed, with prodigious fury, in regard to the great events about to transpire. The extent of General Pope's army was forty-three thousand men, and he set forth to overwhelm Lee, whom McClellan was telegraphing as having two hundred thousand. The actual truth, as it was understood at the time, is stated in the report of the General of the Army of Virginia: "I well understood, as does every military man, how difficult and how thankless was the duty devolved upon me, and I am not ashamed to say that I would have gladly avoided it, if I could have done so consistently with my sense of duty to the Government. To confront with a small army vastly superior forces, to fight battles without hope of victory, but only to gain time, and to embarrass and delay the forward movement of the enemy is, of all duties, the most hazardous and most difficult that can be imposed upon any general or any army. While such operations require the highest courage and endurance on the part of the troops, they are, perhaps, unlikely to be understood or appreciated, and the results, however successful, have little in them to attract popular attention and applause. At no time could I have hoped to fight a successful battle with the im-

mensely superior force of the enemy which confronted me, and which was able at any time to outflank me and bear my small army to the dust. It was only by constant movement, by incessant watchfulness, and hazardous skirmishes and battles, that the forces under my command were not overwhelmed, while at the same time the enemy was embarrassed and delayed in his advance upon Washington, until at length the forces from the Peninsula were assembled for the defense of the city. I did hope that, in the course of these operations, the enemy might commit some imprudence, or leave some opening of which I could take such advantage as at least to gain a partial victory over his forces. This opportunity was presented by the advance of Jackson upon Manassas Junction ; but, although the best dispositions possible under the circumstances were ordered, the object was frustrated in a manner and by causes which are now well understood."

That General Pope fulfilled the requirements of his position is shown by the correspondence between himself and the authorities. His sole mission was to delay the advance of the enemy, and so early as August 25th he says to Halleck : " You wished forty-eight hours to assemble the forces from the Peninsula behind the Rappahannock, and four days have passed without the enemy yet being permitted to cross. . . . I understood that the army was to maintain the line of the Rappahannock, until all the forces from the Peninsula had united behind that river. I have done so. I understood distinctly that I was not to hazard anything except for this purpose, as delay was what was wanted." In his reply to this, Halleck states : " Not the slightest dissatisfaction has been felt in regard to your operations on the Rappahannock. The main object has been accomplished, in getting up troops from the Peninsula." Upon the termination of the campaign, General Halleck expressed his acknowledgments of its results in terms of the highest praise.

To Pope, in his dispatch of August 31st, Halleck says : " You have done nobly. . . . I am doing all I can for you and your noble army. God bless you and it ! "

Upon his return to Washington, the President, General Halleck, and the Secretary of War signified to General Pope their high appreciation of the vigor and skill with which he had conducted the campaign, and their entire satisfaction with its results. Nor did they hesitate to express their indignation at the treacherous conduct which, by withholding aid and refusing to act at the opportune

moment, had converted the promise of victory into disaster. The authorities demanded of this officer an instant official report of his operations, which was at once prepared. But in twenty-four hours the Government had changed its tone. President Lincoln would at once have decapitated McClellan, even if he had not summoned a court-martial, as was afterward done with regard to Porter, who was a mere tool. But Stanton was afraid. With all his bluster, the great War Secretary was a great coward. He was afraid that the arrest of McClellan would cause a revolt in the Army of the Potomac. And so he temporized; McClellan was restored to the command, and Pope was left to endure an undeserved obloquy.

The first collision was at Cedar Mountain upon the 9th of August. From that time until the 31st every day witnessed a series of skirmishes, battles, and marches without cessation. Hardly an hour passed without the roar of cannon and the rattle of small-arms. The enemy was flushed with victory. They had hunted McClellan to his hole upon James River, and, in the full pride of success, had turned to crush a new foe. The Army of Virginia sullenly retired, presenting at all times an undaunted front, for it was the only shield between confident rebellion and the capital of the nation.

Its leader was animated by one spirit only. Upon the last day of his fight, when pressed by the enemy in front, and in rear surrounded by those upon whom he knew he could not depend, yet game to the last, he dispatched to Halleck: "You may rely on my giving them as desperate a fight as I can force our men to stand up to. I should like to know whether you feel secure about Washington should this army be destroyed. I shall fight it as long as a man will stand up to the work." This shows nothing of the white feather.

There is now no complaining of what had been done or what had not been done. There is but one thought, but one purpose. He proposed to do his duty.

"If I save this army now, I tell you plainly I owe no thanks to you or any other persons in Washington. You have done your best to destroy this army."

This was what the other man said; and it is plain, as stated in the April article, that Pope and McClellan ought not to be named in the same century. Of course not!

The Army of Virginia is consigned to the realms of history, with the brief eulogy pronounced upon it by competent authority,

who, after reviewing the events which have been narrated, speaks thus :

“The Army of Virginia appears to have nobly performed the arduous and perilous work committed to its hands. Its campaign was brief, but marked by signal vigor and ability, and animated by a spirit which, shrinking from neither toil, exposure, nor danger, bravely struck the enemy whenever and wherever he could be found.”

D. THEW WRIGHT.